Constitutional Review in Chile Revisited: A Revolution in the Making by Figueroa, Dante
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 51 
Number 2 Articles from the Current 
Constitutional Issues in the Americas Seminar 
Article 6 
2013 
Constitutional Review in Chile Revisited: A Revolution in the 
Making 
Dante Figueroa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dante Figueroa, Constitutional Review in Chile Revisited: A Revolution in the Making, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 387 
(2013). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol51/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Constitutional Review in Chile Revisited: A
Revolution in the Making
Dante Figueroa*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 388
II. BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN
COMMON AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS ................. 389
III. BRIEF REFERENCE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
CHILE BEFORE 1970 (DATE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CREATING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) ..................... 392
A. Constitutional Review Under the
Constitution of 1833 .......................... 392
B. The Constitutional Review System in the
Period 1925 to 1970.... ................. 394
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW EXPERIENCE
FROM 1970 TO 1980 .................... .......... 396
V. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW FROM 1980 TO 2005............398
A. The Role of the Supreme Court during the
1980-2005 Period ........................ 399
B. The Role of The Constitutional Tribunal
During the 1980-2005 Period .. ............. 401
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW SINCE 2005 ... ........... 403
A. New Powers Granted to the Constitutional
Tribunal ................................. 403
1. New Matters Subject to the Preemptive
* Dante Figueroa is a comparativist of civil and common law institutions and an
Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown Law Center and the American University Washington
College of Law. He holds LL.M. degrees from the American University and University of
Chile law schools and is a member of the Chile, Washington, D.C., New York, and the U.S.
Supreme Court bars. He has authored three books, co-authored a fourth, two of which have
received awards by the Inter-American Bar Association (IABA). He has published about
thirty specialized publications that are available at http//ssrn.com/author=1015723, and is
the current elected Secretary General of the IABA. He is fluent in Spanish, English,
French, and Italian, and can be reached at df257@georgetown.edu. Unless expressly stated,
all the translations are by the author. The author wishes to thank Jonathan Arendt, a
Chilean attorney and LL.M. at the Washington College of Law, for his valuable assistance
on this project. This paper was prepared for the Seminar entitled "Current Constitutional
Issues in the Americas" held at the Duquesne University School of Law from November 9 to
10, 2012.
387
Duquesne Law Review
Constitutionality Control ....... ....... 403
2. Writ of Inapplicability for
Unconstitutionality .................... 404
3. Writ of Unconstitutionality ..... ...... 406
B. Problems Concerning the Application of
Article 93 § 6 of the Chilean Constitution:
An Abstract Constitutionality Control in
Lieu of a Concrete Constitutionality Control
When Deciding Writs of Inapplicability .......... 408
VII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
TESTS BY THE CHILEAN CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBUNAL ...................................... 411
VIII. THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN
THE CHILEAN SUPREME COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL ...................... 413
A. Debate Between the Constitutional
Tribunal and the Supreme Court
Concerning the Possibility of Declaring
the Inapplicability of the Repealed Article
116 of the Tax Code..........................413
B. According to the Supreme Court, in
Certain Cases the Declaration of
Inapplicability of a Statute by the
Constitutional Tribunal Does Not Bind the
Supreme Court When Deciding a Writ of
Protection .................................. 416
IX. CONCLUSION .................................... 418
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to present the main developments
of Chilean constitutional law during recent times, specifically re-
garding the historical evolution of the constitutional review of
statutes. This article advances the thesis that the latest trajectory
of constitutional review in Chile shows that the Chilean constitu-
tionality control system has advanced far from peacefully, from a
diffuse review system pivoting around the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice toward a concentrated constitutional review scheme charac-
terized by the primacy of the Constitutional Tribunal. According-
ly, the paper will review: (i) the main differences between civil
and common law systems concerning judicial review; (ii) the his-
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torical evolution of the constitutionality control in that country
before and after the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal in
1970; (iii) the main changes introduced by the constitutional
amendment of 2005 to the functions and prerogatives of the Chile-
an Constitutional Tribunal; (iv) the juridical conundrums arising
from writs of inapplicability, specifically the application of an "ab-
stract control" instead of "a concrete control"; and (v) to illustrate
the provocative title of this article, this paper will examine the
ongoing conflicting situations that have arisen between the Su-
preme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Tribunal focusing
on the most important cases dealing with pressing constitutional
issues in that country.
II. BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS
Both civil and common law recognize the supremacy of the con-
stitution as the supreme law of the land.' In fact, the second
clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution is known as
the Supremacy Clause,2 and Article 6 of the Chilean Constitution
states Chile's Constitutional Supremacy Principle.3 In the United
States, Justice Marshall and the Court established the concept of
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison': when a conflict exists be-
tween an act of the legislature and the Constitution, judges have
the duty to apply the latter, based on the doctrine that "the consti-
tution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature."' In Chile,
1. Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade, Comparative Constitutional Law: Judicial Review,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977, 977 (2001).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
3. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 6 ("The organisms of
the State shall act according with the Constitution and the rules passed in accordance with
it, and they shall guarantee the institutional order of the Republic. The provisions of this
Constitution oblige either to the members of those organisms as to any other person, insti-
tution or group. The infringement of this provision will result in the liabilities and sanc-
tions determined by the statute.")
4. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
5. Phillip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1, 1 (2003); see
also Daniel Gamaas-Holmes, Judicial Review: Fostering Judicial Independence and Rule of
Law (Law and Justice in the Americas, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 5., 2007), availa-
ble at httpRllawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/1jawps/5.
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the supremacy of the Constitution has been recognized in greater
or lesser degree since the first constitutions of that country.'
It is possible to identify three constitutional review systems in
both civil and common law jurisdictions:' the political review, the
judicial review, and a mixed review system.' In the political re-
view system, which is used in England and the Netherlands-a
common law and a civil law country, respectively-the legislature
controls the constitutionality of its own legislation.? In contrast,
under a judicial review system, the courts have the power to de-
cide whether or not the statutes violate the constitution.o Finally,
the mixed system-used in Switzerland, for example-employs
judicial review with respect to cantonal laws and a political con-
trol regarding federal statutes."
Judicial review is the most widely used constitutionality control
mechanism in both civil and common law countries. However,
several differences exist between the structure of European civil
law countries and the U.S. common law system. In fact, these dif-
ferences are reflected in the way judicial review is conducted
among these countries. There are differences concerning the
courts in charge of carrying out the review; the procedures aimed
at determining the constitutionality of a statute;12 the type of con-
trol-abstract or concrete-used by judges for that purpose; and,
finally, the effects of decisions establishing that a statute violates
the Constitution. 3
First, the courts that carry out the constitutionality review in
each system differ in nature. In the United States, there is a dif-
6. MARIO VERDUGO MARINKOVIC, NOTAS SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DE LA SUPREMACIA
CONSTITUCIONAL Y DE Los DECRETOS SUPREMOS DE EJECUCiON [NOTES ABOUT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY PRINCIPLE AND THE SUPREME DECREES OF EXECUTION] 387-
88 (Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales Universidad de Talca, Santiago, Chile,
2003).
7. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 978.
8. Id.
9. Javier Couso, Models of Democracy and Models of Constitutionalism: The Case of
Chile's Constitutional Court, 1970-2010, 89 TEx. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2011); see also Sandra
Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in England and the United
States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 (1986).
10. Allan R. Brewer-Carfas, Judicial Review in Venezuela, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 439, 439
(2007).
11. Mauro Cappelletti & John Clarke Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: European
Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1207, 1216 (1966); see also Fernandes,
supra note 1, at 978.
12. Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251, 254
(2004).
13. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 979-86.
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fused system where "either state or federal courts may hear con-
stitutional claims." 4 Therefore, regular judges have the authority
to review the constitutionality of laws." In contrast, in civil law
countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, and Austria, there are
"special courts, which stay outside the ordinary judicial system
and retain a jurisdictional monopoly over constitutional issues.""6
These special tribunals, known as "constitutional tribunals" or
"constitutional courts," were created in Europe starting in 1920,
based on the work of Hans Kelsen. Kelsen promoted the creation
of an independent tribunal to review the constitutionality of stat-
utes."
The lack of stare decisis in civil law systems has been identified
as the reason that judicial review is an exclusive prerogative of
the constitutional courts in the civil law world.' Unlike the Unit-
ed States, in civil law countries, the highest courts' decisions gen-
erally are not binding for lower courts. Therefore, in order to
avoid contradictory decisions among regular tribunals that gener-
ate uncertainty in the legal system, civil law countries allocate the
exclusive power to invalidate statutory norms to special courts.
Furthermore, constitutional courts were created in Europe where
most countries have parliamentary systems. Under parliamen-
tary systems, the executive and legislative powers were merged
because the government is comprised of members of the Parlia-
ment. This affects the traditional principle of separation of pow-
ers. Therefore, creating "a 'fourth' branch of government [which
was] conceived as a check on that majority" was necessary.20
Another difference between the civil and common law constitu-
tional review systems is the kind of procedure used to carry out
the constitutional review.2 ' On the one hand, in the U.S. common
law system there is no special constitutional procedure, so judges
use regular procedures to that effect. As an author explains, "[aill
courts, for example, applying the same procedures, decide either
14. Id. at 979.
15. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 252.
16. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 980-81; see also Rai Letelier Wartenberg, Jueces
Ordinarios y Justicia Constitucional [Regular Judges and Constitutional Justice], 34 REV.
CH. DE DER. 539, 561 (2007).
17. Enrique Navarro Beltrdn, El Control De Constitucionalidad De La Leyes En Chile
(1811-2011) [The Constitutionality Review of Laws in Chile (1811-2011)], 43 CUADERNOS
DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 31 (2011).
18. Cappelletti & Adams, supra note 11, at 1218.
19. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 983-84.
20. Id. at 984-85.
21. Cappelletti & Adams, supra note 11, at 1219.
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the validity of a contract or the right to an abortion."2 2 On the
other hand, civil law countries have created special procedures for
constitutional litigation.2 3
As a consequence of the aforementioned situation, the type of
control exercised by the courts is, in general, also different. In
fact, in the U.S. common law system, courts carry out concrete
constitutional control because they only determine the constitu-
tionality of a rule when deciding actual cases. 24 Instead, in Euro-
pean civil law countries, constitutional courts make an "abstract"
control implemented "by contrasting the challenged legislation
"25
with a provision of the constitution, without considering any
facts from a given case.26
Finally, regarding the effects of the decisions, in non-European
civil law systems, court decisions are binding only for the parties
involved in a particular case; thus, they only produce particular
effects, also called "inter partes."2 7 Contrarily, in European civil
law systems the decisions issued by the courts have erga omnes
effects as they are binding for the parties to a particular litigation
and also for third parties.2 8 However, this difference is more theo-
retical than real when the U.S. Supreme Court decides a case be-
cause its decisions are not only binding for the parties, but also for
the lower courts under stare decisis.29
III. BRIEF REFERENCE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CHILE BEFORE
1970 (DATE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CREATING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT)
A. Constitutional Review Under the Constitution of 1833
Under the Chilean Constitution of 1833, ordinary judges could
not review the constitutionality of laws.30 The Constitution only
allowed a political review by the National Congress," establishing
22. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 979.
23. Id.
24. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 254-55.
25. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 983.
26. Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review-And Why It May
Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2770 (2003).
27. See Cappelletti & Adams, supra note 11, at 1222.
28. Id.
29. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 980.
30. Edith Z. Friedler, Judicial Review in Chile, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 321, 326-27
(2000).
31. Couso, supra note 9, at 1523.
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in Article 164 that "[o]nly the Congress, according with articles 44
et seq, can solve doubts concerning the understanding of any of its
sections."32
Consequently, scholars and the Supreme Court understood that
the judiciary had to apply a statute when deciding cases, regard-
less if the statute were constitutional or not.3 3 For instance, a
scholar of that time wrote that judges "in charge of issuing a deci-
sion, cannot refuse to apply a statute, even if, in their opinion, it is
unconstitutional."3 4 In sum, judges could not "judge" the law, they
could only apply it. However, this general approach of the judici-
ary and constitutional scholars started changing by the end of the
nineteenth century. For instance, the Supreme Court of Justice in
a written communication to court of appeals throughout the coun-
try, dated January 2, 1867, stated that:
No court in charge of applying the laws has the authority to
declare a law unconstitutional. ... [However,] the authorities
in charge of applying a statute or a rule to a particular case,
shall, nevertheless, give preference to the Constitution on
that specific matter, if the statute or rule clearly violates the
Constitution.
Furthermore, a minority group of scholars thought that if a
statute violated the Constitution, judges could not apply the stat-
ute in order to apply the Constitution, under the principle of the
primacy of the latter." As an author of that time explained, there
were those "who believe that in the case of a contradiction be-
tween an ordinary statute and the Constitution, the tribunal
would not be able to not apply the latter with preference. They
base their opinion in that the constitutional provisions have a su-
"37perior status than the statutory provisions....
In sum, during the period under analysis, the constitutional re-
view system that governed was the "political review" system,
where the legislature itself controlled the constitutionality of its
actions. At the beginning, the Supreme Court understood that it
32. Enrique Navarro BeltrAn, Notas Sobre La Evolucidn Hist6rica Del Control De
Constitucionalidad De Las Leyes En Chile [Notes Concerning the Historical Evolution of the
Constitutionality Review in Chile], 2 REv. CH. DE HIST. DEL DER. 1231, 1233 (2010).
33. See Friedler, supra note 30, at 327 & n.24.
34. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1233.
35. Id. at 1234.
36. Id. at 1235.
37. Id.
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had to apply the statutes notwithstanding their unconstitutionali-
ty-otherwise, they would be judging an act of the Congress with-
out the authority to do so. However, the opinion of the Supreme
Court and of a minority group of scholars evolved into a new theo-
ry. The new theory followed the rule that when there was a stat-
ute that contradicted the Constitution, judges had to prefer the
application of the Constitution because it had a superior status
within the Chilean legal system.
B. The Constitutional Review System in the Period 1925 to 1970
The Constitution of 1925, which ruled Chile until 1973, estab-
lished important changes regarding the constitutionality review
system extant under the Constitution of 1833. Specifically, the
new Constitution established a judicial constitutionality review,
which was conferred to the Chilean Supreme Court. In effect, the
second paragraph of Article 86 of the Constitution of 1925 pre-
scribed that: "The Supreme Court, when deciding particular cases
or cases from other tribunals, which are brought before her
through a Writ, may declare the inapplicability, in that particular
case, of any statute that violates the Constitution."" This provi-
sion introduced a new mechanism to carry out constitutional re-
view in Chile, by means of the "Writ of Inapplicability." Under
this new legal institution, the Supreme Court gained the authority
to determine whether a statute was unconstitutional, and thus
whether it should be applied in a particular case.
Under the new authority, the Supreme Court had to carry out
an "abstract constitutionality control." As it was explained by the
Supreme Court itself in 1961:
This writ, as it has been frequently repeated, has an abstract
and doctrinaire character, thus when deciding the case the
tribunal cannot analyze the facts, since constitutionality is a
matter of law . .. and the Supreme Court in that case has to
decide it merely analyzing the challenged statute and the con-
stitutional provision allegedly violated."
As explained by Chilean scholars, this new system received inspi-
ration from the U.S. judicial review system, where, under Mar-
bury v. Madison, the judiciary, as a whole, possesses the authority
38. See Friedler, supra note 30, at 328.
39. Navarro, supra note 17, at 26 n. 68.
394 Vol. 51
to control the constitutionality of laws,40 and the U.S. Supreme
Court is the main authority to decide whether a statute violates
the U.S. Constitution.4 ' The decisions of the Chilean Supreme
Court concerning the constitutionality of a statute-stemming
from its new power designed upon the U.S. review system-were
only afforded particular effects, binding only for the litigants in a
given case.
However, the Constitution also adopted some elements from the
European civil law system, such as the existence of a special pro-
cedure to solve constitutionality issues presented before the Su-
preme Court.42 In addition, during the 1925-1970 period, judicial
review was concentrated and not diffuse, as is the case in the U.S.
judicial review scheme where the whole judiciary can carry out the
judicial review. Namely, the Supreme Court was the only tribunal
authorized to decline the application of an otherwise validly en-
acted statute in Chile.43
Regarding the practical application of the Writ of Inapplicabil-
ity, a debate arose during the 1950s and 1960s concerning the
possibility of rejecting the application of a statute based on defects
in its creation when those statutes were not enacted in accordance
with the requirements established by the Constitution." The Su-
preme Court stated that the Writ of Inapplicability had to be con-
strued restrictively, and that legislative policy could not be judged
through this mechanism. Therefore, the Supreme Court could
only declare that a statute was inapplicable when it had substan-
tive defects of unconstitutionality.4 5 In this sense, the Supreme
Court gave deference to the political branches of government: the
executive and the legislative.
On the other hand, Congress continued playing an important
role (particularly the Senate Committee on Constitution, Legisla-
tion, and Justice) in reviewing the constitutionality of bills.46 As
an author points out, the Committee "was the functional equiva-
lent of a constitutional court, with abstract and a priori powers of
review."4 7 In sum, during this period, Chilean constitutionality
40. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Institutional Case for Judicial Review, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1147, 1153-54 (2012).
41. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1236.
42. Letelier, supra note 16, at 552.
43. Friedler, supra note 30, at 329.
44. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1239.
45. Id.
46. Couso, supra note 9, at 1525.
47. Id.
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control passed from an exclusive political review to a system that
included judicial review, where the Supreme Court was the organ-
ism in charge of carrying out constitutional review. This newly
adopted system was influenced not only by the U.S. judicial review
paradigm, but also by the European system, which was reflected
in the fact that only one tribunal was in charge of the constitu-
tional review characterized by the existence of a special writ (with
its own procedure) to determine whether a statute was inapplica-
ble in a particular case.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW EXPERIENCE FROM 1970 TO
1980
During the mid-1960s, a group of constitutional scholars pro-
moted the idea of creating a Constitutional Tribunal in the Chile-
an system that would control the constitutionality of statutes be-
fore they took effect.48 That idea was embodied in Law No. 17,284
of January 23, 1970, which, for the first time in its history, created
the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal.4 9
There were two main reasons to create this tribunal. The first
was the lack of an authority empowered to solve the disputes be-
tween the Congress and the Executive Branch." This was an idea
originally expressed by President Balmaceda in 18911 (in the
middle of a political crisis with Congress that caused a civil war
and ended up with that President committing suicide while in of-
fice) and later by President Eduardo Frei-Montalva in 1969.52 The
second reason derived from the constitutional review experiences
of other countries, which showed the necessity of reviewing the
constitutionality of statutes in a general manner, that is, before
bills become statutes and also after their enactment.53
As already mentioned, the Constitutional Tribunal was created
in 1970 to review the constitutionality of bills through an "ab-
stract," without a "case or controversy" requirement by means of a
comparison between the bill and the Constitution. This preroga-
tive was inspired by the French Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitu-
48. See Friedler, supra note 30, at 330.
49. JORGE MARIO QUINZIo FIGUEIREDO, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL [1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TREATY] 157 (LexisNexis, 2003).
50. Letelier, supra note 16, at 552
51. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1236.
52. Letelier, supra note 16, at 552.
53. Id.
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tional Council)," which "can examine the constitutionality of a
proposed statute only before it becomes law.""
According to Chilean scholars, the constitutional review struc-
ture created in 1970 was a dual but concentrated system, where
the Supreme Court controlled the constitutionality of the statutes
through the Writ of Inapplicability, and the Constitutional Tribu-
nal reviewed the constitutionality of bills. 6 This new Constitu-
tional Tribunal was short-lived (1971-1973) and dissolved by the
military government together with the National Congress." The
new military Junta concentrated the executive and legislative
powers, and the government legislated through a mechanism
known as Decreto Ley (decree-law, or "D.L"). D.L. was also the
case in other de facto governments throughout Latin America dur-
ing the fourth quarter of the twentieth century." A D.L. is an ex-
ecutive decree that regulates a topic that normally would be regu-
lated by a statute, that is, regular legislation, but without the au-
thorization of the Congress. A D.L. is generally regarded as pos-
sessing the same binding authority as a valid statute.
A former member of the Constitutional Tribunal has explained
the role of the Supreme Court during the military government, by
stating that "the relevance of the Writ of Inapplicability from 1973
to 1980 was almost null as a consequence of the effects of the en-
actment of D.L. No. 788 of 1974."" In effect, article 1 of this D.L.
established that if there were a conflict between the legislation
passed by the Administration and the Constitution, government
norms would amend the constitutional provisions.60 As a conse-
quence, the Supreme Court could not enforce the Constitution of
54. Couso, supra note 9, 1528.
55. Fernandes, supra note 1, 982 (emphasis added).
56. Letelier, supra note 16, at 552.
57. Friedler, supra note 30, 331.
58. Alberto Borea Odria, Nuevas Perspectivas Para El Tratemiento De Los Decretos
Leyes De Los Gobiernos De Facto [New Perspectives for the Treatment of Decree Law of De
Facto Governments], 22 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 51,
51 (1995).
59. Eugenio Valenzuela Somarriva, Labor Jurisdiccional De La Corte Suprema: Ambito
de su Competencia en la Prdctica y Funciones de sus Ministros en otros Organismos [Juris-
dictional Work of the Supreme Court: Scope of its Competence in Practice and Function of its
Justices in Other Organisms], 40 CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS PP.BLICOS [JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
POLICY] 137, 152 (1990).
60. Law No. 788, art. 1, Diciembre 4, 1974, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) ("It is de-
clared that if the decree-laws passed until this date by the Government Board, are contrary
or opposite, or different, to any provision of the Political Constitution of the State, they
have had and have the authority of amending rules, either expressly or tacitly, wholly or
partially, of the particular provision of the Constitution.").
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1925, since the executive decrees had the power to amend that
Constitution.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW FROM 1980 TO 2005
In the 1970s, the military Junta created a commission in charge
of drawing a new Constitution for Chile. This commission, known
as Comisi6n de Estudios de la Nueva Constituci6n (Study Com-
mission for the New Constitution, CENC in its Spanish acronym),
was comprised of the most important scholars in the constitutional
law field (all sympathetic to the regime). Their work was the ba-
sis of the Constitution of 1980, which, with some important
amendments, is the Constitution that still governs Chile today.
During the Commission's work sessions, the members discussed
the characteristics of judicial review, particularly regarding the
Writ of Inapplicability. The discussion centered, first, on the topic
of whether the Writ of Inapplicability should proceed when a stat-
ute had a formal defect of constitutionality, namely, that it was
not passed in accordance with the requirements established by the
Constitution; or, on the other hand, only when the statute had a
substantive constitutionality defect, that is, that the content of its
dispositions violates the Constitution." The second point of delib-
eration concerned whether it was necessary that a pending case
exists for the Writ to be declared admissible, thus mirroring the
"case or controversy" requirement of U.S. constitutional law. And
the last matter in debate, and the most controversial, was whether
the effects of the Supreme Court's decision should have general or
particular effects.62
Several proposals were advanced to regulate this last issue. For
instance, a proposal was made to establish that after three deci-
sions of the Supreme Court declaring the inapplicability of a stat-
ute, "the inapplicability would produce general effects."6 3 This
proposal was criticized because it would have altered the principle
of balance among the three powers of government by establishing
a Supreme Court with the power to repeal a statute passed by an-
other branch of government (Congress).' Additionally, there was
61. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1241.
62. Id. at 1242.
63. Mariela Rubano Lapasta, Valor Juridico De Las Sentencias De Inaplicabilidad De
Las Leyes [Juridical Value of the Decisions of Inapplicability of the Laws], 202 REVISTA DE
DERECHO UNIVERSIDAD DE CONCEPCION 225, 226 (1997).
64. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1242.
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also a proposal to establish that the Constitutional Tribunal could
declare the unconstitutionality of a statute if the Supreme Court
had previously declared the inapplicability of that statute in three
cases." This proposal was also rejected by the military Junta who
preferred the original proposal of the CENC, which did not con-
template the declaration of unconstitutionality with general ef-
fects either by the Supreme Court or by the Constitutional Tribu-
nal." Consequently, the final text of the Constitution of 1980 es-
tablished the same constitutional review system that existed dur-
ing the early seventies, namely, that the Supreme Court was in
charge of reviewing the constitutionality of statutes through the
Writ of Inapplicability, and the Constitutional Tribunal was in
charge of reviewing the constitutionality of bills.6
A. The Role of the Supreme Court during the 1980-2005 Period
On its own initiative, and pursuant to its constitutional powers,
the Supreme Court developed admissibility requirements for the
Writ of Inapplicability. First, it required the existence of a pend-
ing issue before a tribunal;" second, that the challenged rule had
to have the same binding authority as a statute within the Chile-
an legal system, which excluded lower ranked rules, such as gov-
ernment regulations;" third, that the challenged statute had to be
directly related to the issue pending before the tribunal that ini-
tially was deciding the case;o fourth, that there had to be "an ab-
solute contradiction between the statute and the Constitution;""
and, fifth, that the challenged statute could not have been de-
65. Id. at 1243.
66. Sergio Verdugo Ramfrez, La Declaraci6n De Inconstitucionalidad De Las Leyes
Como Control Represivo Abstracto. Una Especie De Nulidad De Derecho Pdbliro Atenuada
En Sus Efectos [The Unconstitutionality Declaration of Statutes as an Abstract Repressive
Control. A Kind of Public Voidance Lessened in its Effects], 18 REVISTA ACTUALIDAD
JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DEL DESARROLLO 247, 249 (2008).
67. Teodoro Ribera Neumann, El Tribunal Constitucional Y Su Aporte Desarrollo Del
Derecho [The Constitutional Court and Its Contribution to the Development of the Law], 34
CENTRO DE EsTUDIos PJBLICOS [PUBLIC POLICY JOURNAL] 195, 196 (1989).
68. Gustavo Heise Burgos, Mecanismos de Control de Constitucionalidad en el Derecho
Chileno y su Evolucion [Control Mechanisms of Constitutionality Review in the Chilean Law
and Its Evolution] (Dec. 6, 2006), 7,
http://www.derecho.uchile.cl/jornadasdp/archivos/Gustavo%20Heise%20Burgos.pdf.
69. Navarro, supra note 17, at 38.
70. Id.
71. Heise, supra note 68, at 7 (emphasis added).
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clared constitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal in exercise of
its preemptive constitutionality review powers over bills. 2
With respect to the second requirement, the Supreme Court in-
cluded norms that in the Chilean System have the same binding
authority as legislation, that is, rules whose value is inferior to the
Constitution but superior to government regulations. Examples
include the decretos ley (decrees-law), decretos con fuerza de ley
(decrees with force of laws),7 3 and even international treaties.
Furthermore, the challenged rule had to be limited to a specific
provision, that is, it was not possible to challenge an entire stat-
ute.74 As stated by the Supreme Court in one decision in 1994,
"[t]he writ of inapplicability for unconstitutionality restrains the
power of this Court to declare such unconstitutionality, allowing it
only regarding precise and certain provisions of a statute . . . and
prohibits its declaration when the intention is to extend it to an
entire legal body."
Regarding the fifth requirement, the last paragraph of Article
83 of the Constitution prohibited the Supreme Court from declar-
ing the inapplicability of a statute based on an alleged defect that
the Constitutional Tribunal had previously declared as according
with the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court understood
that it had the authority to issue such a declaration if the statutes
in question were challenged based on other defects." Further-
more, there were several discussions concerning practical matters,
such as whether the Supreme Court had to declare the inapplica-
bility of a statute enacted prior to the entry into effect of the Con-
stitution of 1980 and with some provisions having been deemed
contrary to that Constitution." In addition, there was also a dis-
cussion concerning the possibility of filing a Writ of Inapplicability
regarding a statute that had formal constitutionality defects, such
as not being passed in accordance with the constitutional re-
quirements.
72. Navarro, supra note 17, at 39.
73. Decretos con fuerza de ley are governmental decrees that regulate a topic that nor-
mally is governed by a statute, authorized by the Congress.
74. Navarro, supra note 17, at 38.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 39.
77. Francisco Vega & Francisco Ziiiiiga, El Nuevo Recurso de Inaplicabilidad por
Inconstitucionalidad ante el Tribunal Constitucional. Teoria y Prdctica [The New Writ of
Inapplicability for Reason of Unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court. Theory
and Practice], 4 ESTuDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES UNIVERSIDAD DE TALCA 135, 145 (2006).
78. Id.
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Concerning the possibility of declaring the inapplicability of a
statute implicitly repealed by a subsequent constitutional provi-
sion, the Supreme Court had two different approaches. From
1981 to 1990, the Supreme Court considered that if a contradiction
existed between a statute passed before the Constitution of 1980,
that statute was tacitly repealed by the Constitution. As the Su-
preme Court put it, "the writ of inapplicability for unconstitution-
ality is not admissible if a statute contradicts the Constitution
passed afterwards." 9 The Court stated that in those cases the
problem was not the constitutionality of a statute, but the survival
of a statute in time, and that this was an issue left to resolution by
regular judges when deciding the initial cases where the issue of
constitutionality arose.80  However, from 1990 to 2005, the Su-
preme Court changed its mind, and decided that it could declare
the inapplicability in those cases." As explained in one case by
the Supreme Court:
If trial judges can decide that the general law ... which is the
Constitution . . . has repealed an ordinary special statute or-
dinary or special [sic], also the Supreme Court can declare the
unconstitutionality of the latter according with article 80 of
the Constitution, which does not differentiate between stat-
utes passed before or after it.82
The Supreme Court rejected the possibility of declaring the inap-
plicability of a statute based on formal constitutionality defects.
The reason was that such power would entail that the Supreme
Court had the authority to repeal a statute passed by Congress,
which would affect the principle of separation of powers estab-
lished by the Constitution."
B. The Role of The Constitutional Tribunal During the 1980-
2005 Period
The most prominent role of the Constitutional Tribunal during
the late 1980s and early 1990s was its contribution to the political
transition in Chile from an authoritarian regime to a democratic
system. In the late 1980s, the Constitutional Tribunal had a cen-
79. Navarro, supra note 17, at 40 n.135.
80. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1246.
81. Vega & Ziifiiga, supra note 77, at 145.
82. Navarro, supra note 17, at 40 n.136.
83. Friedler, supra note 30, at 343.
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tral role in reviewing a set of statutes known as "political stat-
utes," which regulated basic aspects of the democratic process in
Chile such as the tribunal in charge of supervising the future elec-
tions, the procedure to create political parties, and topics related
to the voting system.
An example of the Constitutional Tribunal's relevant contribu-
tion to the restoration of a democratic regime in that country is
found in the Bill of Political Parties of 1987, where the Tribunal
determined that that bill "violated several provisions of the Con-
stitution, such as the right of political association, the autonomy of
the political parties, and the constitutional guarantee of due pro-
cess of law.""
Moreover, in 1987, the Constitutional Tribunal declared the un-
constitutionality of the bill that created the Tribunal Calificador
de Elecciones (Electoral Court, which is in charge of supervising
the elections)." In this case, the Constitution of 1980 established
that a plebiscite had to be held in 1988 to determine whether a
candidate proposed by the military Junta would be president for a
period of eight years (1989-1997). According to the Constitution, if
the candidate lost the election, the military Junta had to call for
parliamentary and presidential elections for the next year.
The Constitutional Tribunal declared the unconstitutionality of
the Bill creating the Electoral Court because one of its provisions
established that the new Electoral Court had to start functioning
for the first parliamentary and presidential election, that was go-
ing to be held on December 1989. Instead, the Tribunal estab-
lished that the Electoral Court had to start functioning before the
above-mentioned election, particularly for the plebiscite of 1988.
The reasoning was that this bill contradicted the constitutional
provisions that regulated the public electoral system in Chile, be-
cause, according to the Constitutional Tribunal, the Electoral
Court was in charge of verifying that the plebiscites were made in
accordance with the Constitution. Therefore, the Electoral Court
had to start its functioning for the plebiscite of 1988.88
84. Navarro, supra note 17, at 43.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Couso, supra note 9, at 1531.
87. Id.
88. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C] [Constitutional Court], 1985, No. 33 (Chile).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW SINCE 2005
A. New Powers Granted to the Constitutional Tribunal
Law No. 20,050 of 2005 introduced several amendments to the
Constitution of 1980. Among the main changes, new powers were
given to the Constitutional Tribunal, which centered on its exclu-
sive jurisdiction to exercise judicial review of bills and enacted
legislation. On the one hand, the 2005 amendments granted the
Constitutional Tribunal the prerogative of exercising a preemptive
constitutionality control, that is, before a bill is approved by Con-
gress and enacted into law. Likewise, the amendments estab-
lished new types of rules and legislation that are subject to the
Constitutional Tribunal's review powers. Concerning the Tribu-
nal's a posteriori remedial review powers, that is, after the statute
takes effect, the amendments conferred two tools to the Constitu-
tional Tribunal: (1) the Writ of Inapplicability for Unconstitution-
ality, which was previously under the jurisdiction of the Chilean
Supreme Court, and (2) the new Writ of Unconstitutionality."
1. New Matters Subject to the Preemptive Constitutionality
Control
As was the case with the original text of the Constitution of
1980, the 2005 amendments subjected some bills to mandatory
review by the Constitutional Tribunal. Others, instead, are sub-
ject to discretionary review. During the period 1980 to 2005 the
following bills were subject to mandatory constitutional review:
Leyes Interpretativas de la Constituci6n (Statutes Interpreting the
Constitution) and Leyes Orgdnicas Constitucionales (Constitution-
al Organic Statutes, namely, special statutes that require a spe-
cial voting quorum to be passed by Congress).o The 2005
amendments added another category of bills subject to mandatory
review, that is, "the provisions of international treaties that regu-
late topics belonging to a Constitutional Organic Statute."" The
rationale was that Constitutional Organic Statutes regulate the
most relevant areas of societal life such as education, political par-
89. CARLOS CRUZ-COKE OSSA, INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS Y DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL
[POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] ch. II 663-64 (Universidad Finis Ter-
rae, 2009).
90. These laws require a quorum of 3/5 and 4/7 of the representatives and senators in
office, respectively.
91. CRUZ-COKE, supra note 89, at 668.
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ties, the functioning of tribunals, mining concessions, and armed
forces, among others. A Chilean author has advanced the idea
that this amendment recognized the theory that international
treaties have the same legal authority as a statute9 2 and thus,
must be in accordance with the Chilean Constitution. In regards
to this issue, the Constitutional Tribunal had already exercised its
review powers over several international treaties regulating topics
normally covered by a Constitutional Organic Statute such as In-
ternational Labor Organization Convention No. 169 about Indige-
nous and Tribal Peoples ("ILO Convention 169")." In this case, in
2008 a group of Members of Congress filed a constitutionality re-
view request before the Constitutional Tribunal indicating that
the topics covered by ILO Convention 169 pertained to an organic
constitutional statute and that, in consequence, its constitutional
review by the Constitutional Tribunal was mandatory. The Con-
stitutional Tribunal held that "the rules under review ... regulate
topics reserved by the Constitution to organic constitutional stat-
utes, since, in the special cases referred to in the Convention, they
establish ways of participation for indigenous peoples at national,
regional, and municipal levels .... "9
On the other hand, there are statutes which do not require a
mandatory, previous, constitutional review, inter alia, ordinary
laws, and leyes de quorum calificado (qualified-quorum statutes,
which have to be approved by the absolute majority of representa-
tives and senators in office)." In these cases, the Constitutional
Tribunal cannot act sua sponte (on its own initiative). Instead, its
intervention must be requested by "the President of the Republic;
by any of the Houses of the National Congress; or by a fourth of
the members in office of any of the Houses of Congress."6
2. Writ of Inapplicability for Unconstitutionality
In an effort to concentrate the function of constitutional review
in one organism, in 2005, new Article 93, Section 6 of the Consti-
tution granted the Constitutional Tribunal the power to decide
constitutional challenges brought by means of the Writ of Inap-
92. Id.; see also Jos6 Luis Cea Egafia, La Praxis Del Control De Constitucionalidad En
Chile [The Praxis of the Constitutionality Review in Chile] (2007) (part of a conference of-
fered before the Federal Supreme Tribunal of Brazil).
93. Navarro, supra note 17, at 46.
94. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C] [Constitutional Court], 2008, No. 1050 (Chile).
95. CRUZ-COKE, supra note 89, at 670.
96. Id.
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plicability for Unconstitutionality." Article 93, Section 6 estab-
lishes that the Constitutional Tribunal shall: "[diecide, by the ma-
jority of its active members, the inapplicability of a statute whose
application in any matter pending before an ordinary or special
tribunal, is contrary to the Constitution.""
Furthermore, Article 93, Section 10 prescribes that the Writ of
Inapplicability can be filed by any of the litigants or by the judge
of the case. The criteria to determine the admissibility of the Writ
are the following: (1) a pending issue before an ordinary or special
tribunal must exist; (2) the application of the challenged statute
must be outcome-determinative in a particular case; (3) the chal-
lenge has to be reasonably founded; and (4) there must be compli-
ance with the remaining requirements established by the applica-
ble statutes. While exercising its powers, the Tribunal may decide
whether to suspend the original procedure where the issue is be-
ing discussed.
Article 47(g) of the Constitutional Organic Statute of the Consti-
tutional Tribunal established the grounds for the declaration of
inadmissibility of a given Writ of Inapplicability: (1) for lack of
standing; (2) when the challenged statute has been already de-
clared constitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal, regarding the
same alleged defect; (3) when there is no pending issue before an-
other court, or the issue was already solved by another court; (4)
when the challenged rule is not a statute (for example, an execu-
tive decree); (5) when from the circumstances it can be determined
that the statute will not be applied or will not be decisive in solv-
ing the issue (the U.S. doctrine of "mootness"); or (6) when the
Writ is not reasonably founded.
Before 2005, former Article 80 of the Constitution of 1980 estab-
lished that the Supreme Court could declare the inapplicability "of
a statute contrary to the Constitution" in a particular case.9 After
the 2005 amendment, Article 93, Section 6 authorizes the Consti-
tutional Tribunal to declare "the inapplicability of a statute whose
application in any matter before a regular or special tribunal, is
contrary to the Constitution.""oo Chilean authors have highlighted
the considerable difference between these two provisions. In ef-
fect, while before 2005 a challenged statute had to be contrary to
97. Navarro, supra note 17, at 49.
98. CONSTITUCI6N POLTICA DE LA REPJBLICA DE CHILE IC.P.] art. 93, § 6 (Constitution
of 1980, as amended in 2005).
99. Id. at art. 80.
100. Id. at art. 93, § 6.
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the Constitution in a general or abstract sense 1' (that is, without
the need of a "case or controversy"), after 2005 the inapplicability
can be declared when the consequences of the application of the
statute to the particular case are unconstitutional, even if the
statute, on face value, accords with the Constitution.102
Moreover, the Constitutional Tribunal had stated in 2006 that
[Wihile before 2005 a direct confrontation between the statute
and the Constitution had to occur, now we are in the presence
of a different situation. In fact, what can be declared uncon-
stitutional nowadays is the application of a statute, which
relativizes the abstract exam of constitutionality, establishing
a clear difference with the previous constitutional text.103
Therefore, when reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, the
Constitutional Tribunal has to carry out a concrete constitutional-
ity control, that is, determine if the result of the application of a
statute to a particular case is contrary to the Constitution.'
3. Writ of Unconstitutionality
Since the late 1970s, the idea of having a legal mechanism to
declare the unconstitutionality of a statute erga omnes, with gen-
eral effects, was subject to heated discussions. The CENC pro-
posed this idea without success.o' Eventually, the Writ of Uncon-
stitutionality was the main novelty brought about by the amend-
ments of 2005, since it was the first time that the Chilean legal
system had a mechanism to allow a tribunal to repeal a statute for
violating the Constitution. 0 6
This was a huge reform because it departed from the French
traditional view of judges as the "mouthpiece of the law" 07 and
from the French theory of strong separation of powers-which has
101. Javier Couso Salas & Alberto Coddou MacManus, La Naturaleza Juridica De La
Acci6n De Inaplicabilidad En La Jurisprudencia Del Tribunal Constitucional: Un Desafto
Pendiente [The Legal Nature of The Writ of Inapplicability in the Jurisprudence of the Con-
stitutional Court: A Challenge Pending], 8 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 389, 396 (2010).
102. Cea, supra note 92, at 6; see also Navarro, supra note 32, at 1251.
103. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 2006, No. 546 (Chile).
104. Couso & Coddou, supra note 101, at 396.
105. Navarro, supra note 17, at 120.
106. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1253.
107. Dante Figueroa, Twenty-one Theses on the Legal Legacy of the French Revolution in
Latin America, 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 39, 81 (2010); see also Robert S. Barker, Judicial
Review in Costa Rica: Evolution and Recent Developments, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 267,
267-68 (2000).
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deeply influenced the Latin legal systems since the early eight-
eenth century'os-under which judges did not have the authority
to overrule the legislature. The amendments of 2005 incorporated
a new Article 93, Section 7 establishing that the Constitutional
Tribunal can "[diecide, by the majority of four fifths of its active
members, the unconstitutionality of a statute declared inapplica-
ble according to the previous section.""o' Article 93, Section 11
adds that:
Once the declaration of inapplicability of a statute in accord-
ance with section 6 of this article is decided in a previous de-
cision, there will be public action to request the declaration of
that statute's unconstitutionality to the Tribunal, notwith-
standing the power of the Tribunal to declare it on its own ini-
tiative.110
From the aforementioned provisions, the following requirements
can be deduced: (1) the challenged rule has to be a statute;' (2)
that statute has to have been declared inapplicable by the Consti-
tutional Tribunal prior to the unconstitutionality request;112 (3)
the declaration of unconstitutionality can be requested by any
person (public action) or declared by the Constitutional Tribunal
sua sponte;"'1 and (4) there has to be "an absolute contradiction
between the challenged statute and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion."114
Regarding the effects of the unconstitutionality declaration, Ar-
ticle 94, Section 3 of the Constitution prescribes that the statute
will be repealed from the moment of publication of the decision
that declared the unconstitutionality in the Official Gazette. Such
declaration does not have retroactive effect. Furthermore, Article
94, Section 4 establishes that the decision must be published with-
in three days of its issuance.
As explained by a Chilean author, the new constitutional sys-
tem "accepts the provisional constitutionality and validity of the
unconstitutional rules unless and until 'repealed' by the Constitu-
108. Figueroa, supra note 107, at 71.
109. CONsTITUcioN POLITICA DE IA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 93, § 7.
110. Id. at art. 93 § 11.
111. Vega & Zlitiiga, supra note 77, at 153.
112. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1254.
113. Vega & Zdiiga, supra note 77, at 149.
114. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1254.
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tional Tribunal.""' That is to say, the unconstitutionality declara-
tion of a statute does not produce retroactive effects. Therefore,
the statute that was declared unconstitutional is considered re-
pealed as of the publication of the Constitutional Tribunal's opin-
ion declaring the statute's unconstitutionality in the Official Ga-
zette, but it is otherwise considered valid regarding the cases
where the statute was applied before such publication. However,
as it will be discussed later, the issue of when the unconstitution-
ality declaration produces effects is still controversial.
As of this date the Constitutional Tribunal has declared the un-
constitutionality of four statutory provisions: (1) Article 116 of the
Tax Code, which allowed the Regional Director of the Chilean In-
ternal Revenue Service (formerly a first instance court in the tax
trials) to delegate its jurisdiction in an employee of its office;' (2)
Article 171 of the Sanitary Code, which required that in order to
file a claim against a penalty established by the National Health
Service, the claimant had to present a receipt proving payment of
the fine imposed (thus the sanction had to be complied with in or-
der to be challenged);1 17 (3) Article 595 of the Organic Code of Tri-
bunals, which prescribed that the abogados de turno (lawyers on
duty), which is a system where Chilean lawyers are appointed, pro
bono, for one month a year to represent indigent clients (only the
phrase "pro bono" was declared unconstitutional);1 and (4) Arti-
cle 38 of the Health Care Law, which made it permissible "to in-
crease the health care plan according to the sex and age [of the
people] ."11'
B. Problems Concerning the Application ofArticle 93 § 6 of the
Chilean Constitution: An Abstract Constitutionality Control
in Lieu of a Concrete Constitutionality Control When Deciding
Writs of Inapplicability
As previously mentioned, the Writ of Inapplicability in Chile
passed from an abstract constitutionality control under the origi-
nal text of the 1980 Constitution, to a concrete constitutionality
115. CRUz-COKE, supra note 89, at 675.
116. Navarro, supra note 32, at 1254.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Luis Alejandro Silva Irarrizaval, JEs El Tribunal Constitucional El Supremo
Intirprete De La Constituci6n? ["Is The Constitutional Tribunal the Supreme Interpreter of
the Constitution?"], XXXVII REVISTA DE DERECHO DE LA PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD
CATOLICA DE VALPARAfso 573, 585 (2012).
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control after the 2005 amendments. Several authors suggest that
this change is the consequence of the repeated criticisms by schol-
ars who considered that under the original text of the Constitution
of 1980 the declaration of inapplicability was discriminatory. In
effect, the charge was that since the Supreme Court declared the
inapplicability when a statute generally violated the Constitution
(for having an objective defect of constitutionality) such declara-
tion was valid exclusively for the particular case where the Writ
was filed. The resulting outcome was that the same statute was
deemed to be in accordance with the Constitution in all other cas-
es, unless the affected party filed another independent Writ of In-
applicability against the same statute.120
The criticism centered on the fact that the Constitutional Tri-
bunal exercised constitutionality review without distinguishing
between an abstract and a concrete constitutionality control. 121
For example, in one case the Tribunal stated that the application
of a statute can be unconstitutional based on two circumstances:
(1) when the statute is intrinsically unconstitutional, and thus its
application would violate the constitution; or (2) when the statute
is constitutional in a general sense, but when applied to a particu-
lar case it produces a result that is unconstitutional.122
According to some authors, the Tribunal's declaration that a
statute is inapplicable because it intrinsically violates the Consti-
tution, is, in practice, an "abstract control" because the statute is
only confronted with the Constitution, without considering the
results of its application to the particular case.123  According to
Couso and Coddou, the Constitutional Tribunal is applying two
constitutionality controls when deciding a Writ of Inapplicability:
(1) a previous abstract constitutionality control, and (2) a subse-
quent concrete constitutionality control. This double constitution-
ality test was deemed with Article 93, Section 6 of the Constitu-
tion, which only authorizes the inapplicability of a statute "whose
application . . . is contrary to the Constitution", that is, it only au-
thorizes a concrete constitutionality control.
120. Fernando Atria Lemaitre, Inaplicabilidad Y Coherencia: Contra La Ideologia Del
Legalismo [Inapplicability and Coherence: Against the Idea of Legalism], XII REVISTA DE
DERECHO UNIVERSIDAD AUSTRAL DE CHILE 119, 120 (2001).
121. Couso & Coddou, supra note 101, at 402.
122. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C] [Constitutional Court], 2008, No. 1038 (Chile).
123. Alan Bronfinan, El Caraicter Privado Del Proceso De Inaplicabilidad Por
Inconstitucionalidad [The Private Nature of the Process of Inapplicability Due to Unconsti-
tutionality] XXXVII REVISTA DE DERECHO DE LA PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CAT6LICA DE
VALPARAISO 243, 256 (2011).
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To illustrate this difficult point further, in 2008 the Constitu-
tional Tribunal decided a case in which a law professor who
worked for a State-sponsored university was fired based on his
representation of a client charged with drug trafficking. The uni-
versity relied on a statute prohibiting lawyers hired with public
funds from undertaking the representation of clients accused of
drug trafficking. 124 The petitioner argued that the statute violated
several constitutional guarantees, such as the freedom to work,
the right to counsel, and the prohibition of arbitrary discrimina-
tion. Moreover, he claimed that a lawyer not working for a public-
ly funded university may represent a client under drug trafficking
charges.12 5  The Constitutional Tribunal dismissed the request
based on "the goal protected by the statute, the severity of the
moral reproach against the crimes related to the prohibition, and
the liberty of legislators when determining the content of the [con-
cerned] statutes."'2 6 Dissenting judges were of the opinion that
the prohibition of performing specific professional services did not
violate the constitution when it is "[r]easonable to consider that
these particular services would undermine any of the unique four
values on which the prohibition can be based (that is, contrary to
the public morals, public safety and public healthiness, or when
the national interest requires it pursuant to a statutory provi-
sion)."'27 As a consequence, the dissenting judges manifested that
it was necessary to undertake a reasonability test to determine
whether the prohibition was unconstitutional in that particular
case. The judges concluded that
the prohibition and the penalty of dismissal ... are unreason-
able since they do not seem to be an appropriate means to
fight drug trafficking or to promote administrative probity ...
in the case of a lawyer that performs a public function as a
part-time professor in a public university; moreover . . . it is
not the institutional mission of a university to fight drug traf-
ficking.12 8
124. Couso & Coddou, supra note 101, at 406.
125. Id. at 407.
126. Id.
127. Id.
12& Id. at 408.
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In this case, the dissenting vote carried out a concrete control of
the constitutionality of the statute applied to the circumstances of
the particular case.
As it may be appreciated in the aforementioned case, authors
contend that the problem in the application of a proper constitu-
tionality control in the Writ of Inapplicability is caused by the
flawed design of the constitutional review system.1 29 In fact, the
Chilean model contemplates a dual constitutionality control in
charge of the Constitutional Tribunal: (1) an abstract control for
the constitutionality review of bills and for the Writ of Unconstitu-
tionality, and (2) a concrete control for the Writ of Inapplicability.
In consequence, the Tribunal has had enormous practical difficul-
ties when differentiating both types of controls.
VII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS BY THE
CHILEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL
After the 2005 amendments, the Constitutional Tribunal adopt-
ed a new constitutionality litmus test, namely, the Proportionality
Principle (or Proportionality Test), to conduct its constitutional
review responsibilities. Extensive borrowing from the experiences
of the German and Spanish constitutional tribunals took place
during the early years after the amendments.130 Under this prin-
ciple, the legislature must restrict constitutional rights in an ap-
propriate way, that is, there has to be a relationship of propor-
tionality between the intensity of the restriction and the im-
portance of the limited rights.
For a determination of whether a proper relationship between
the restriction and the affected rights exists, the Proportionality
Test is used under two requirements: (1) that the restriction pur-
sues the fulfillment of a social objective of certain importance;'
and (2) that it is demonstrated "that the means used to restrict
the right are reasonable and justifiable."'3 2 Regarding this second
requirement, a restriction on constitutional rights can be consid-
129. Id. at 420.
130. Jos4 Francisco Garcia Garcia, El Tribunal Coastitucional Y El Uso De "Tests": Una
Metodologia Necesaria Para Fortalecer La Revision Judicial Econ6mica [The Constitutional
Court and the Use of Tests: A Necessary Methodology for Strengthening Economic Judicial
Review], 38 REV. CH. DE DER. 101, 104 (2011).
131. Dante Figueroa & Arturo Fernandois, Comparative Constitutional Protection of
Contracts in the United States and Chile, INT'L LEGAL RESEARCH INFORMER 9, (Summer
2012), http-//www.asil.org/pdfs/IG/ILRIGInformerIssue%204_Final.pdf.
132. Id.
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ered reasonable and justifiable when the challenged measure: (a)
"is carefully designed to achieve the legislative purpose;""as (b) im-
pairs the exercise of the concerned right "as little as possible;"134
and (c) is proportional as compared to the purpose sought and
"considering the importance of the right at stake."' 5
The Constitutional Tribunal has used this Proportionality Test
in different contexts including when determining "whether a civil
penalty is constitutional," "whether an administrative measure
deprives a citizen of a welfare benefit," "and whether the modifi-
cation of a contract produces unconstitutional effects concerning
property rights."3 In the landmark case of HQI Transelec S.A. v.
Empresa Eldctrica Panguipulli S.A. decided in 2006,"' the peti-
tioner filed a Writ of Inapplicability against a statute that
changed the manner in which it calculated the prices of its ser-
vices pursuant to the contract established by the parties.1 3 1 Arti-
cle 19, Section 24 of the Chilean Constitution guarantees owner-
ship rights regarding corporal and incorporeal assets, and the lat-
ter have long been deemed to include contractual rights. Conse-
quently, the petitioner claimed that this new statute violated its
constitutionally-protected ownership rights under the contract.
The Constitutional Tribunal, however, decided in favor of the con-
stitutionality of the statute, holding that even though the price is
an essential element of the contract, the economic consequences of
the change were not sufficient to consider the legislative measure
as a violation of property rights.3 9
Moreover, in 2008, the President of the Chilean Bar Association
(Colegio de Abogados) filed a writ of unconstitutionality challeng-
ing Article 575 of the Organic Code of Tribunals, which estab-
lished the institution called abogados de turno under which law-
yers had to work pro bono representing indigent clients in trial for
one month in a given calendar year, as already mentioned. The
petitioner argued that Article 575 violated the constitutional right
to equality before the law and also the right of equality vis-A-vis
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 6 marzo 2007, "HQI
Transelec C.S. v. Empresa Elctrica Panguipulli S.A..," Rol de la causa: 505-06 (Chile),
available at http//www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/wp/descargar-expediente.php?id=22955.
138. Figueroa & Fernandois, supra note 131, at 8 n.20.
139. Id.
412 Vol. 51
public burdens.140 The Constitutional Tribunal carried out a pro-
portionality test of Article 595 of the Organic Code of Tribunals, 141
concluding that "the lawfulness of the goals pursued by the legis-
lator does not justify the use of disproportionate and burdensome
means, which affect the property of the lawyers appointed to be on
duty, who certainly have the right to a just remuneration for their
professional services."142 In addition, the Tribunal reasoned that
the pro bono burden "does not seem to be a necessary or justifiable
means to achieve the constitutional goal pursued."143 Consequent-
ly, the Constitutional Tribunal struck down the ancient pro bono
obligation formerly established for lawyers by the Organic Code of
Tribunals.'"
As an author rightly points out, the adoption of the proportion-
ality test by the Constitutional Tribunal
has become a sort of "legal revolution" in a country with such
a legalistic culture as Chile [but that] [i]n spite of the argu-
ments against this new criterion, the application of the pro-
portionality test to measure the constitutionality of legislative
and administrative decisions has enriched the debate about
rights limitations. 4
VIII. THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE CHILEAN
SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL
A. Debate Between the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme
Court Concerning the Possibility of Declaring the
Inapplicability of the Repealed Article 116 of the Tax Code
In 2007, the Constitutional Tribunal, sua sponte, declared the
unconstitutionality of Article 116 of the Chilean Tax Code, which
allowed the Regional Director of the Chilean Internal Revenue
Service (formerly a first instance court in tax trials) to delegate its
140. Rainer Arnold, Jos6 Ignacio Martinez Estay & Francisco Zdifiga Urbina, El Princip-
io De Proporcionalidad En La Jurisprudencia Del Tribunal Constitucional [The Principle of
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal], 10 ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUCIONALES UNIVERSIDAD DE TALCA 65, 90 (2012).
141. Id.
142. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 2009, No. 1254 (Chile).
143. Arnold, Martinez & Zidfiiga, supra note 140, at 90.
144. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 2009, No. 1254 (Chile).
145. Figueroa & Fernandois, supra note 131, at 9.
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jurisdiction in an employee of its office.146 This was the first time
that the Constitutional Tribunal declared the unconstitutionality
of any statutes under the new prerogatives granted by the 2005
amendments.14 7 Since the repeal of Article 116 in 2007, several
claims were filed challenging the validity of administrative trials
where delegates of the Regional Director of the Internal Revenue
Service (SII) acted as administrative judges.4 s For example, in
2007, a circuit court (the Court of Appeals of Rancagua) declared
in one case that the acts of the SII's employees under the delega-
tion scheme were void, because they became illegal after the re-
peal of Article 116.149 In 2007 the Supreme Court adopted a dif-
ferent criterion, establishing that the unconstitutionality declara-
tion of Article 116 does not produce retroactive effects; the implicit
consequence of this opinion was to uphold the validity of the appli-
cation of Article 116 before its repeal.so In view of this conun-
drum, the Supreme Court decided to request the Constitutional
Tribunal to declare the inapplicability of Article 116 in those cas-
es, and to use that declaration as the basis for denying effects to
the actions of the delegates."'
The Constitutional Tribunal, however, refused to issue an opin-
ion on several writs of inapplicability brought by the Supreme
Court in cases initiated before the declaration of unconstitutional-
ity of Article 116 of the Chilean Tax Code in 2007, which were
pending before the Supreme Court; the Constitutional Tribunal
reasoned that there was no statute to apply in those particular
cases. 152 Moreover, in 2006 the Internal Revenue Service had is-
sued a resolution declaring without effect any delegation made by
a Regional Director to an employee of its office. 53
146. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 2007, No. 681 (Chile). The
reasons why this provision was considered unconstitutional are the following: (i) According
to Article 76 of the Chilean Constitution, the authority to judge only belongs to the Courts
established by law; (ii) Article 19 No3 prescribes that nobody can be judge by special com-
missions, instead there should be a Court previously established by law; (iii) according to
Article 5 of the Constitution, the authority to judge is an attribute of sovereignty, and sov-
ereignty only can be exercised by the authorities established in the Constitution; therefore
the authority to judge cannot be delegated.
147. Cea, supra note 92, at 19.
148. Verdugo, supra note 66, at 280-81.
149. Id. at 281.
150. Id. at 282.
151. Id.
152. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 2008, No. 901 (Chile).
153. Gonzalo Guerrero V., La Fuerza Vinculante De Las Sentencias Del Tribunal
Constitucional Chileno. Una Aproximacidn Desde La Reforma Constitucional De 2005 [The
Binding Force of the Decisions of the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal. An Approach from
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The importance of the constitutional conflict that arose between
the two courts lay in that, one the one hand, Article 94 of the Con-
stitution provides that once a statute is declared unconstitutional
it is considered repealed from the date of publication of the Tribu-
nal's opinion in the Official Gazette. Therefore, despite its virtual
unconstitutionality, a statute retains its validity and must be ap-
plied to the cases decided prior to the declaration of unconstitu-
tionality.154 Accordingly, the Supreme Court argued that the Con-
stitutional Tribunal "when refusing this request, actually . . .
leaves the petitioner in an unequal situation regarding other peti-
tioners that, in the same legal situation, had obtained a declara-
tion holding that the provision [article 116] is inapplicable."55
On the other hand, as already said, the Constitutional Tribunal
determined that Article 116 could not be applied retroactively be-
cause: (1) the statute was repealed only in 2007, and (2) in 2006
the Internal Revenue Service had issued a resolution declaring
without effect any delegation made by a Regional Director to an
employee of its office. 16 Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the
Supreme Court had the constitutional authority to judge the valid-
ity of the decisions of delegate tax judges issued before the repeal
of Article 116.5 In other words, the Constitutional Tribunal told
the Supreme Court that they could not declare the inapplicability
of a statute that had been already applied.
A dissenting justice of the Constitutional Tribunal argued that
the Constitutional Tribunal should have issued a decision in those
cases because: (1) the repeal of a statute is not an impediment to
declare its inapplicability;s (2) the repeal of a statute does not
prevent the fact that the statute can be decisive in solving the cas-
es that were initiated when the statute was valid;5 . and (3) as
already stated, before Article 116 was repealed the Constitutional
Tribunal had declared the inapplicability of this provision in more
than thirty cases pending before regular tribunals where Article
116 had been already applied.o
the Amendment of 2005], 17,
http://www.congresoconstitucional.cl/upload/69/Gonzalo%20Guerrero 1252881542.pdf.
154. Verdugo, supra note 66, at 279.
155. Cea, supra note 92, at 20.
156. Guerrero, supra note 153, at 18.
157. Cea, supra note 92, at 19-20.
158. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 2008, No. 901 (Chile).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Finally, since 2008 the Supreme Court has solved this issue by
voiding, sua sponte, the tax trials where SII's employees acted as
tax judges. 61 The argument used by the Supreme Court has been
that: (1) the procedure requires three elements to be valid: the
parties, a conflict, and a tribunal;162 and (2) the repealed Article
116-which gave jurisdiction to the delegates-was a procedural
norm which applied during the entire procedure. As a conse-
quence, the repeal of Article 116 implies that it can no longer be
applied in those procedures, and having lost their jurisdiction over
the cases, the tribunals were invalid and the procedures became
void.163
B. According to the Supreme Court, in Certain Cases the
Declaration of Inapplicability of a Statute by the
Constitutional Tribunal Does Not Bind the Supreme Court
When Deciding a Writ of Protection
Article 19 of the Chilean Constitution establishes several consti-
tutional rights within sections 1 to 26, inter alia, the right to life
and to physical and psychological integrity," equality before the
law,"' freedom of conscience and religion,"' and the right to prop-
erty.' Article 20 of the Constitution prescribes that a person can
file a writ of protection before a Court of Appeals if that person is
"deprived, disturbed or threatened in the legitimate exercise of the
rights and guarantees established" in some of these sections (not
all of them are covered) by an "arbitrary and illegal act or omis-
sion."16 The Court of Appeals must "immediately adopt all the
necessary measures to reestablish the rule of law and to ensure a
proper protection for the affected person.""' The decisions of the
Court of Appeals can be appealed before the Supreme Court ac-
cording with Article 98 of the Organic Code of Tribunals.
A dilemma arose in 2011 when the Supreme Court "rejected a
writ of protection, applying a statute that had been declared inap-
161. Verdugo, supra note 66, at 282.
162. Id. at 282 n.98.
163. Id.
164. CONSTITUCION POIATICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, § 1.
165. Id. at art. 19, § 2.
166. Id. at art. 19, § 6
167. Id. at art. 19, § 24.
168. Id. at art. 20.
169. Id.
plicable by the Constitutional Tribunal."o In that case, the Ad-
ministrative Corporation of the Judicial Power refused to pay an
appellate judge his performance bonuses because he did not com-
ply with the legal requirement of working for more than six
months in a calendar year.171 The judge claimed that he could not
work because he had a catastrophic illness, which could be proved
with medical certificates. 172 However, he did not receive his bo-
nuses because a statute (Article 4, section 5 of Law No. 19,531)
established that the only approved exceptions were medical certif-
icates for labor accidents or maternal leave.17 3 Consequently, the
judge filed a writ of protection before the Court of Appeals for Val-
paraiso.
The Court of Appeals requested the Constitutional Tribunal to
declare the inapplicability of the aforementioned provision, on the
grounds that it violated the petitioner's rights of equality before
the law and to property."' The Constitutional Tribunal declared
the inapplicability of the provision and the Court of Appeals
granted the writ of protection, ordering the payment of the bonus-
es to the judge."' On appeal from the Court of Appeals, the Su-
preme Court stated that the declaration of inapplicability was not
binding for the Supreme Court when deciding the case because the
challenged provision was applied before the inapplicability decla-
ration."' Namely, when the Administrative Corporation refused
to pay, it had the legal obligation to do so because the challenged
statute did not allow to pay bonuses if a person did not work at
least six months a year due to a catastrophic illness. Thus, when
taken, the act was not illegal and, consequently, one of the criteria
to grant the writ of protection (illegal act) was not fulfilled."' Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court denied the writ of protection. 178
As previously mentioned, the Constitutional Tribunal declared
the unconstitutionality of Article 575 of the Organic Code of Tri-
170. Silva, supra note 119, at 592; see also Libertad y Desarrollo, Vinculatoriedad del
Precedente del Tribunal Constitucional para la Corte Suprema [Binding Nature of the Con-
stitutional Tribunal's Precedent for the Supreme Court] 21 FALLOS PMJBLICOS 1 (Jan. 2012),
available at http://www.lyd.com/wp-
content/files mf/fallospublicos2ltconstitucionalycsuprema.pdf.
171. Silva, supra note 119, at 592.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Libertad y Desarrollo, supra note 170, at 3.
176. Silva, supra note 119, at 593.
177. Libertad y Desarrollo, supra note 170, at 4.
178. Id. at 3-4.
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bunals establishing the "pro bono" obligation of lawyers. In 2008,
a lawyer had filed a writ of inapplicability against his appoint-
ment as abogado de turno by two family judges in the city of
Osorno, a claim which was rejected by the respective Court of Ap-
peals."'9 The decision was challenged by an appeal at the Su-
preme Court and a writ of inapplicability at the Constitutional
Tribunal.
The Constitutional Tribunal declared that Article 575 of the Or-
ganic Code of Tribunals was inapplicable because the word pro
bono made the abogados de turno institution "disproportionately
burdensome."so Despite the inapplicability declaration, the Su-
preme Court rejected the appeal of the writ of protection, holding
that the only unconstitutional problem of the appointment was the
pro bono aspect, but the lawyer had all the legal mechanisms to
charge for his work."18
IX. CONCLUSION
During its almost 180 years, the Chilean constitutional review
system has experienced a very important revolution, passing from
review by the legislature to the current system where a special
tribunal is in charge of the constitutionality control. The different
systems adopted by the Chilean Constitutions have been influ-
enced by the experiences of other countries, such as the U.S. judi-
cial review (since the Constitution of 1925) and the European judi-
cial review (since the creation in 1970 of the Constitutional Tribu-
nal). The resulting model is one that combines elements of both
models: (1) a special tribunal in charge of carrying out the consti-
tutionality review (as in the European system); (2) a concrete con-
stitutionality control approach when deciding writs of inapplicabil-
ity (as in the U.S. system), and an abstract constitutionality con-
trol approach when reviewing the constitutionality of bills and
when deciding writs of constitutionality (as in the European Sys-
tem); and (3) regarding the effects of the decisions of the Chilean
Constitutional Tribunal, where (as in the U.S. system) the decla-
ration of inapplicability produces inter partes effects, and where,
(as in the European system) the unconstitutionality declaration
produces erga omnes effects.
179. Silva, supra note 119, at 593-94.
180. Id. at 594.
181. Id.
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On the other hand, despite the fact that in the 1973-80 period
judicial review was nonexistent in Chile, the Constitutional Tri-
bunal played during the late 1980s, under the Constitution of
1980, a very important role in the transition to democracy by en-
suring that the statutes that governed that process were made in
accordance with the principles and values established in the Con-
stitution. Moreover, the 2005 amendments constituted a huge
step towards a concentrated system of constitutional review, by
granting the Constitutional Tribunal not only the Writ of Inap-
plicability (previously under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court), but also the Writ of Unconstitutionality, which allowed the
Tribunal to repeal the statutes passed the Congress, thus chang-
ing the traditional relationship between the judiciary and the leg-
islature in that country.
Overall, this paradigm change has also created new challenges
and debates regarding the binding authority and the effects of the
Constitutional Tribunal's decisions, particularly regarding how
the Supreme Court has to deal with them. The Supreme Court
still retains constitutional jurisdiction to decide Writs of Protec-
tion, which often entails that the Court take into account the con-
stitutionality of a statute under the color of which the respond-
ent's action or omission is challenged.
Furthermore, after the 2005 amendments, the Constitutional
Tribunal has adopted new tests to determine whether a law re-
stricts a constitutional right or guarantee. Therefore, the propor-
tionality test has been a very efficient tool to guide the Tribunal's
reasoning when deciding Writs of Inapplicability and Unconstitu-
tionality.
In sum, the Chilean judicial review system is a revolution in the
making, where despite the apparent improvements, new challeng-
es will arise in the future that will likely contribute to enhance the
mechanisms aimed at ensuring the effective implementation of the
Constitutional Supremacy Principle in Chile.
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